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Abstract 
 
 
A firewall is a hardware or software device that performs inspection on a given 
incoming/outgoing packets and decide whether to allow/deny the packet from 
entering/leaving the system. Firewall filters the packets by using a set of rules called 
firewall policies. The policies define what type of packets should be allowed or 
discarded. These policies describe the field values that the packet header must 
contain in order to match a policy in the firewall. The decision for any given packet 
is made by finding the first matching firewall policy, if any. 
 
In a traditional firewall, the packet filter goes through each and every policy in the 
list until a matching rule is found, the same process is again repeated for every 
packet that enters the firewall. The sequential lookup that the firewall uses to find the 
matching rule is time consuming and the total time it takes to perform the lookup 
increases as the policy in the list increases. Nowadays, a typical enterprise based 
firewall will have 1000+ firewall policy in it, which is normal. 
 
A major threat to network firewalls is specially crafted malicious packets that target 
the bottom rules of the firewall’s entire set of filtering rules. This attack’s main 
objective is to overload the firewall by processing a flood of network traffic that is 
matched against almost all the filtering rules before it gets rejected by a bottom rule. 
As a consequence of this malicious flooding network traffic, the firewall 
performance will decrease and the processing time of network traffic may increase 
significantly 
 
The current research work is based on the observation that an alternative method for 
the firewall policies can provide a faster lookup and hence a better filtering 
performance. The method proposed in this research relies on a basic fact that the 
policy can be represented as a simple Boolean expression. Thus, Binary Decision 
Diagrams (BDDs), are used as a basis for the representation of access list in this 
study. 
 
 viii 
The contribution of this research work is a proposed method for representing firewall 
policies using BDDs to improve the performance of packet filtering. The proposed 
mechanism is called Static Shuffling Binary Decision Diagram (SS-BDD), and is 
based on restructuring of the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) by using byte-wise 
data structure instead of using Field-wise data structure. Real world traffic is used 
during the simulation phase to prove the performance of packet filtering. The 
numerical results obtained by the simulation shows that the proposed technique 
improves the performance for packet filtering significantly on medium to long access 
lists. Furthermore, using BDDs for representing the firewall policies provides other 
useful characteristics that makes this a beneficial approach to in real world. 
 
Keywords:  Firewall, Packet Filter, Binary Decision Diagram, Early Rejection, 
Packet Matching. 
  
 
  
 xi 
 )cibarA ni( tcartsbA dna eltiT
 
 الرفض المبّكر لطرود البيانات باستخدام رسم القرار الثنائي
 
 صالملخ
 
والخارجة، ثم يقرر إما الجدار الناري هو جهاز أو برنامج يقوم بفحص طرود البيانات الواردة 
يرّشح الجدار الناري طرود البيانات باستخدام قواعد تسمى . السماح لها أو منعها من العبور
تصف هذه السياسات قيم الحقول في بادئة طرد البيانات التي تماثل . سياسات الجدار الناري
 .السياسة، ويتخذ الجدار الناري القرار بناًء على أول سياسة متطابقة
ي الجدر النارية التقليدية، يمر طرد البيانات على كل السياسات، واحدة تلو الأخرى حتى ف
ويعتبر البحث . تتكرر هذه العملية لكل الطرود بلا استثناء. يصادف وجود سياسة مطابقة
المتسلسل عن سياسة متطابقة مستهلكا ًللوقت، كما أن الوقت اللازم للمطابقة يزداد طردا ًبالنسبة 
وتحتوي الجدر النارية على أكثر من ألف سياسة مضبوطة في هذه . د السياسات المضبوطةلعد
 .الأيام
تشكل بعض الطرود خطراً على الجدر النارية، حيث تستهدف هذه الطرود الخبيثة آخر سياسة 
مضبوطة لكي ترهق الجدار الناري، في حين يعالج الجدار الناري هذه الطرود ويحاول 
وإّن إرسال فيٍض من هذه  . ل السياسات المضبوطة حتى يصل إلى آخرهامطابقتها مع ك
 .الطرود الخبيثة يؤدي إلى نقص في أداء الجدار الناري وزيادة ملحوظة في وقت المعالجة
إّن البحث الحالي مبني على ملاحظة أن استخدام طرق أسرع للبحث سوف يؤدي إلى أداء 
 naelooBلسياسات يمكن تمثيلها كتعبيرات منطقية أفضل، وهو مبني أيضا ً على حقيقة أن ا
 .في هذه الدراسة DDBوبناء على ذلك، تم استخدام رسم القرار الثنائي  .snoisserpxe
ويتجلّى الإسهام في هذا العمل عبر طريقة مقترحة لتمثيل سياسات الجدار الناري باستخدام رسم 
وتسّمى الطريقة المقدمة رسم القرار . لتحسين أداء ترشيح طرود البيانات DDBالقرار الثنائي 
وتستخدم هذه الطريقة إعادة ترتيب رسم القرار الثنائي  .DDB-SSالثنائي الُمخلّط بسكون 
وقد تم استخدام طرود بيانات . بدلاً من الحقل etybباستخدام تكوين بيانات مبني على البايت 
ثبات فعالية الطريقة، كما أن القياسات المستخرجة تظهر أن هذه الطريقة حقيقية في المحاكاة لإ
 .تحسن الأداء بشكل ملحوظ في السياسات متوسطة الطول والطويلة
 
 x 
الجدار الناري، ترشيح طرود البيانات، رسم القرار الثنائي، الرفض  :مفاهيم البحث الرئيسية
 .المبّكر، مطابقة طرود البيانات
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
The Internet has come a long way since its inception, the accomplishment in terms of 
data accessibility and availability has been growing exponentially over the couple of 
decades (Cheswick, 2003). Today every other business is now reorganizing itself to 
utilize the power of the Internet to connect to its users. The type of services and 
application available on the Internet have become more powerful – starting from a 
simple static webpage in the 1990s to online banking, shopping. The fact of 
increasing number of users using the Internet implies an increasing number of 
malicious attacks, which means that systems and their networks require protection 
from unintentional incidents as well as malicious acts (Nikolaidis, 2000). 
The increasing complexity of the Internet makes the solution of computer network 
security more complex, which is why organization does not use just one solution 
instead they apply layers of security to protect themselves. The best way of ensuring 
security is by using a network firewall. A firewall is a computer, router, or other 
communication device that filters access to the protected network (Nikolaidis, 2000). 
Cheswick and Bellovin (Cheswick, 2003) (Ballew, 1997) define a firewall as a 
collection of components or a system that is placed between two networks and 
possesses the following properties: 
 All traffic from inside to outside, and vice-versa, must pass through it. 
 Only authorized traffic, as defined by the local security policy, is allowed to 
pass through it. 
 The firewall itself is immune to penetration. 
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Firewalling is the easiest method of all used by the network administrator to control 
the access between networks (Ballew, 1997). The idea to use firewall to protect the 
network, is that controlling access to the network and its resources by protecting each 
host is difficult and does not scale (Oppliger, 1998). Firewall solves this issue by 
creating a single connection point for multiple network and providing a single 
security checkpoint. This single checkpoint will have a security policy that defines 
what type of connection is allowed or rejected. It can be assumed that the firewall 
itself is immune to penetration. 
One of the main criticism of firewalls is that they often create bottlenecks 
(Nikolaidis, 2000). The reason of this bottleneck is mainly how the firewall policies 
are constructed. If the policies are not constructed properly then it may cause loss of 
network performance. This motivates the need for faster firewall technologies, 
keeping in mind that there is a tradeoff between performance and security. 
1.2 Firewall Basic Approaches 
Firewall is usually installed at the edge of the network where the private or the 
Intranet connects to the public network, making it easier for the firewall to monitor 
all the traffic at once. Although firewall may also be placed between departmental 
networks within a company. The level of security and behavior exhibited by the 
firewall depends on the type of firewall used but for this research is focused on the 
Packet Filter Firewall. There are three basic approaches that a firewall uses to protect 
the network: packet filtering, circuit level firewall, and application level firewall 
(Cheswick, 2003)  
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1.2.1 Circuit level firewall 
Circuit level firewall is a type of firewall that works at the session layer of the OSI 
model, between the application layer and the transport layer of the TCP/IP stack. 
They monitor the handshaking between two systems and decided whether a request 
session is legitimate or not. It filters the packet, by relying on the data contained in 
the packet headers for the TCP session-layer protocol. These type of firewalls 
usually operates two layers higher than a packet-filtering firewall does. It determines 
if the requested session is legitimate or not by checking the SYN flags, ACK flags, 
and the sequence numbers are involved in the TCP handshaking or not. The issue 
with circuit-level proxy is that it has no understanding of the application protocols 
they support. They cannot scan application data for dangerous commands or 
executable contents.  
1.2.2 Application-level firewall 
Application-level proxy operates at the application layer of the firewall. An 
application-level runs a proxy server for each application that it supports. The proxy 
request on behalf of the user to the destination host. Proxy server has some 
understanding of the application it is supporting and can be configured to reject 
malicious content packets. Application level firewall are not easy to scale. 
1.2.3 Packet filtering firewall 
Packet filtering firewall operates at the network layer and is the simplest type of 
firewall. Since, the firewall operates at the network layer so it has no idea of the 
content of the packets like the other type of firewall mentioned above. The packet 
filtering firewall works on the concept of policies. The policies use the information – 
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source port, destination port, source ip, destination ip, and protocol – to filter 
malicious traffic from the network.  
Security is provided by comparing the packets against the list of the firewall rules 
and deciding whether to allow or deny the packets based on the action defined in the 
matched rule. Packet filtering firewall is widely used as a first line of defense in any 
enterprise. There are numerous reason for it (Cheswick, 2003) (Oppliger, 1998) 
 Faster than other firewall technologies 
 It is a low-cost technology. Many commercial routers have the packet 
filtering capabilities in it. There is various free open-source packet filtering 
firewall available. 
 It is normally transparent to applications and users. 
1.3 Firewall Policy  
The packet filter firewall is usually specified by a set of rules. The rules are a simple 
if-then-else structure with each rule defining the action that should be taken, if any 
packet matches. A set of rules in the firewall is known as access control list, policy 
list or rules (Ballew, 1997). The firewall traverses the rules sequentially to find the 
matching rule for any given packet.  
Defining the firewall policy is simple for any user but it has its own disadvantages if 
they are not defined properly. The order of how the rules are inserted and represented 
in the firewall is of high importance which can affect the overall performance of the 
firewall. For this reason, the packet filtering implementation represents the list of 
policies in the firewall in a linear fashion. The decision making process called lookup 
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goes through each rule one at a time in a linear fashion and decided whether the 
packet should be accepted or rejected until a matching rule is found. The time taken 
to perform the lookup is clearly proportional to the number of rules in the firewall.  
 
1.4 Problem Statement 
 
The main aim of this research is to propose a new representation technique called 
Static Shuffling Binary Decision Diagram or SSBDD for the access list of the 
firewall. The reason to propose a new representation technique is because the 
firewall rules are consulted more frequently and they are modified less frequently. 
There are many representation techniques for the firewall policies which are 
discussed briefly in the Related Work Section but for this research, Binary Decision 
Diagram or BDD is chosen as the base for the representation of the access list. 
SSBDD is a modified version of the regular BDD. Using BDD as the representation 
technique has its own advantages such as: - 
 Each of the rule in the firewall is simply a logical expression that is based on 
the values in the rule. If any packet satisfies the condition in the rule, then the 
packet is either accepted or rejected based on the action in the rule. 
 The entire firewall access list is represented as a single Boolean expression 
that describes (Gupta, 2001) (Trabelsi, 2014) what condition each packet 
must meet. BDD is a very well-known data structure for storing and 
manipulating Boolean expressions compactly and efficiently.  
This research addresses the following question: 
How to perform an early packet rejection using Binary Decision Diagram as its data 
structure? 
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Chapter 2: Related Work 
 
Packet filtering consists into performing a sequential lookup for each network packet 
against the rule list until a matching rule is found. Due to the sequential lookup 
nature of the firewall, the performance of the firewall will degrade over the time if 
the size of the rule list of the firewall increases. Different approaches have been 
proposed to improve firewall performance, using mainly, specialized data structure 
(Srinivasan, 1999) or heuristics solutions (Gupta, 2001).   
The idea of firewall optimization using data mining is discussed in (Trabelsi, 2014). 
The proposed technique uses classifier for packet filtering. At first, the technique 
tries to get the matching classifiers. If it is unable to get any classifier, then it will use 
the firewalls sequential lookup to find the matching rule. 
Another approach is discussed in (Boutaba, 2009), which uses BDD to generate a 
relaxed version of the firewall rules that can be evaluated more quickly. After 
processing a packet, the proposed technique will conclude to one of the three 
following options: accept, reject, or more filtering is required. In case of more 
filtering, the original policy will be used to look for a matching rule in the list, if any. 
In (Zeidan, 2012), Splay Tree based technique (Statistical Splay Filtering with 
Binary Search on Prefix Length) is used to improve the firewall performance. The 
optimization technique allowed the firewall to perform an early packet rejection 
through multilevel filtering process including field and intersection filtering modules. 
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Chapter 3: Using Binary Decision Diagram for Packet Filtering 
 
 
The original idea of BDD packet filter was developed by (Hazelhurst, 1998) (Bryant, 
1992). BDD provides a powerful and flexible way to represent the policies of the 
firewall. Each policy of the firewall can be represented using BDD via a simple 
Boolean expression. Boolean expression is simply consisting of a number of 
predicates, where each predicate shows what path to follow in the BDD. 
Since, in BDD each policy of the firewall is represented as a Boolean expression and 
as the number of policy increases the size of the BDD will increase as well. 
However, BDDs are well-known for its compact representation of Boolean 
expression. So using BDD as a packet filtering approach can provide an advantage in 
terms of performance, which is the most important factor for any firewall. This 
chapter is devoted to describing the BDD approach to packet filtering in detail. 
3.1 Binary Decision Diagram 
Binary Decision Diagram represent Boolean functions as rooted, directed acyclic 
graphs (Bryant, 1992). In a non-technical term, a BDD can look like a decision tree, 
as shown in Figure. 1. Each non-terminal node in a BDD represents a value to a 
particular variable, and each non-terminal node has two children representing the 
possible value for the non-terminal node (0 or 1). The dashed edge corresponds to 
the case where the variable is assigned 0 and the solid edge corresponds to the case 
where the variable is assigned 1. A BDD has two terminal nodes which are Boolean 
constants and has a value of 0 and 1. 
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Figure 1: Binary Decision Diagram 
 
3.2 Ordering and Reducing 
 
The issue with BDD representation is, as the number of policy increases in the 
firewall the size of the BDD also increases as it will increase the Boolean 
expressions. To overcome this problem, (Bryant, 1992) introduced the concept of 
reduced, ordered binary decision diagrams (ROBDDs) that potentially provide a 
much more compact representation for many Boolean expressions. ROBDDs are 
basically a compact version of a BDDs due to the following restrictions on it 
(Bryant, 1992). 
 
 The variables of a ROBDD must obey a total ordering, so that for any vertex 
labelled u and any of its children labelled v, u appears before v along any path 
from the root of the graph to a leaf. 
 A ROBDD may not contain duplicate terminals. This leaves a ROBDD with 
a two terminal vertices (one labelled 0 and the other labelled 1). 
 A ROBDD may not contain duplicate non-terminals. Duplicate non-terminals 
are those that represent the same variable where the corresponding branches 
lead to the same place. 
P1
P2
P4
P2
P5
1
P3
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 A ROBDD may not contain redundant tests. If, at a particular vertex in the 
graph, both possible values lead to the same place, then this test is 
unnecessary. 
 
These restrictions result in ROBDDs possessing some useful properties. Firstly, they 
provide compact representations of Boolean functions. Although in the worst case, 
their graph size can be exponentials in the number of variables, many non-trivial 
Boolean functions have a polynomial size ROBDD (Bryant, 1992). Since ROBDDs 
offers so many advantages over unrestricted BDDs, most applications that use BDDs 
actually use ROBDDs, so it is very common to simple refer ROBDDs as BDDs 
(Andersen, 1997). 
 
3.3 The Variable Ordering Effect 
 
The variable ordering chosen for a BDD has a strong impact on its shape and size 
(Bryant, 1992). If the variable order is not chosen correctly, then it can make the 
BDD for the same Boolean function from a linearly sized to an exponentially sized 
BDD as show in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Two BDDs for the function x1y1 V x2y2 V ... V xnyn for n=3 
For a function that cannot be represented in a compact format, it is best to choose an 
optimal variable ordering for it. However, finding an optimal variable ordering for a 
BDD is a NP-complete problem (Bollig, 1996). As a result, variable order are often 
chosen manually or using some heuristics.  
 
3.4 Binary Decision Diagram Packet Filter 
 
In a BDD as a packet filter, a BDD is used to represent the firewall’s entire policy 
list, and the same BDD is then used to perform lookup on the incoming packets. The 
representation of the BDD is stored in the memory and whenever a new policy is 
added to the list the BDD is then regenerated again. The BDD is a representation of 
the Boolean expression that describes exactly what packets must be accepted or 
rejected. In simple words, all paths through the BDD that lead to the terminal 
labelled 1 represent the types of packets that are accepted, and the opposite is true for 
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all paths leading to the terminal labelled 0. Each node or variable in the BDD refers 
to a specific bit in the packet header. 
 
3.4.1 Boolean Variables 
 
To represent a firewall policy as a BDD it is important to know what variable in the 
BDD refers to which field in the packet header, as each variable in the BDD 
corresponds to a specific bit in the packet header itself. A BDD’s Boolean expression 
will consist of multiple variable; in a normal case each policy is represented by at 
least 104 Boolean variables. Below is the table that describes the variable naming 
that will be used throughout this work. 
 
Header Field Boolean Variables Total 
Number 
Source IP address s_ip1 ... s_ip32 32 
Destination IP address d_ip1 … d_ip32 32 
Protocol type p1 … p8 8 
Source port s_p1 … s_p16 16 
Destination Port d_p1 … d_p16 16 
Total  104  
 
Table 1: The Boolean variable required for BDD representation 
 
 
3.5 Example of Firewall Policy list conversion 
 
The example below demonstrates how a firewall policy list can be converted into a 
Boolean expression. The policy list to be used for the conversion process is shown in 
the Table 2. This BDD has its protocol variables ordered first, followed by the 
variables corresponding to destination information, followed by the variables 
corresponding to the source information. The default policy of the firewall is to deny 
all packets.  
 
Rule Proto Source IP Source 
Port 
Destination 
IP 
Destination 
Port 
Action 
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1 TCP 172.21.1.89 9070 10.2.12.98 80 Permit 
2 TCP 172.25.12.1 7788 81.23.1.87 443 Permit 
Default Policy. 
 
Table 2: Sample Firewall Policy List 
 
  Step 1: Defining the Boolean Variables 
 
The following 5 fields - source address, destination address, source port, destination 
port, and protocol – are used by the packet filter on the incoming packets. By 
summing up all the field sizes of the header gives a total of 104 bits, so a total of 104 
variables are required to represent the BDD of this access list. The variable naming 
to be used for the BDD representation is shown in Table 1. 
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 Step 2: Converting Individual Rules 
 
This step involves in converting the give policy into a Boolean expression. This is 
accomplished by forming a conjunction of each predicate. Let Ri denote the Boolean 
representation of Rule I. To convert the first rule: 
 
Let p = Protocol = TCP 
 = p8’ p7’ p6’ p5’ p4’ p3 p2 p1’ 
 
Let s_p = Source Port = 9070 
 = s_p16’ s_p15’ s_p14 s_p13’ s_p12’ s_p11’ s_p10 s_p9 s_p8’ s_p7 s_p6 
s_p5’ s_p4  s_p3 s_p2 s_p1’ 
 
Let d_p = Destination Port = 80 
  = d_p16’ d_p15’ d_p14’ d_p13’ d_p12’ d_p11’ d_p10’ d_p9’ d_p8’ d_p7 
d_p6’ d_p5  d_p4’ d_p3’ d_p2’ d_p1’ 
 
Let s_ip = Source IP = 172.21.1.89 
 = s_ip32 s_ip31’ s_ip30 s_ip29’ s_ip28 s_ip27 s_ip26’ s_ip25’ s_ip24’ 
s_ip23’ s_ip22’  s_ip21 s_ip20’ s_ip19 s_ip18’ s_ip17 s_ip16’ s_ip15’ s_ip14’ 
s_ip13’ s_ip12’ s_ip11’  s_ip10’ s_ip9 s_ip8’ s_ip7 s_ip6’ s_ip5 s_ip4 s_ip3’ 
s_ip2’ s_ip1 
 
Let d_ip = Destination IP = 10.2.12.98 
 = d_ip32’ d_ip31’ d_ip30’ d_ip29’ d_ip28 d_ip27’ d_ip26 d_ip25’ d_ip24’ 
d_ip23’  d_ip22’ d_ip21’ d_ip20’ d_ip19’ d_ip18 d_ip17’ d_ip16’ d_ip15’ 
d_ip14’ d_ip13’  d_ip12 d_ip11 d_ip10’ d_ip9’ d_ip8’ d_ip7 d_ip6 d_ip5’ 
d_ip4’ d_ip3’ d_ip2 d_ip1’ 
 
Then R1 = p  s_p  d_p  s_ip  d_ip 
 
The expression is constructed similarly for the other rules. 
 
 Step 3: Combining all the rules 
 
Using the steps shown above the expression can be generated for all the rules in the 
same way and once it is done, the next step is generating a single expression for all 
the rules. The expression is generated as follows:  
   Final expression = (R1  R2)   
The final expression says that the incoming packets are either accepted by Rule R1 
or Rule R2. 
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3.6 Performing a Lookup 
 
In a linear or classic BDD, once generated, performing a lookup on the given 
incoming packet is simply a comparison. The comparison starts from the top node or 
root node of the BDD and continues till it reaches a terminal node either 0 or 1. In 
case if it reaches terminal node 0, then the given packet is rejected. However, if it 
reaches the terminal node 1, then the given packet is accepted. 
Figure 3 shows how a regular BDD performs a lookup upon receiving an incoming 
packet. In this paper, this search will be referred as Field-wise search since it checks 
one entire field at a time. 
 
Figure 3: BDD Lookup 
 
3.7 Issues Field-wise lookup 
 
Field-wise lookup gives acceptable performance when the ratio of the accepted traffic 
is higher than the ratio of the rejected traffic. But, if the ratio of accepted traffic is 
very less, compared to the rejected traffic’s ratio, the field-wise search performance 
will degrade. This is because in attacks, like DoS, the traffic usually gets rejected at 
the bottom rules of the firewall.  
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To understand the issues of field-wise BDD lookup, let’s take an example of two 
filtering rules with a protocol field, as shown in Table 3, whose BDD is shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
 
Protocol Decimal Binary 
TCP 6 0110 0000 
ICMP 1 1000 0000 
 
Table 3: Rules 
 
 
 
Figure 4: BDD Tree of Table 3 
 
Considering DoS – it mainly targets the firewall by sending malicious traffic 
targeting the bottom rules of the firewall – the higher the rejection ratio the more 
likely the BDD performance is going to degrade. This is due to the fact, the entire 
BDD will be traversed to reach the final decision.  
 
The issue of the Field-wise lookup can be solved by simply shuffling the field-order. 
For example, instead of checking the IP fields of the packet, it’s much better to check 
the protocol field of the incoming packets. As the field-size is of 8-bit, and a high 
P1
P2
P4
P2
P5
P6P7P8
1
P3
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amount of packet rejection occurs at this field. This solution won’t help the firewall 
to maintain it’s performance for a long period. The traffic received by the firewall 
are random in nature, so relying on one field for early rejection won’t work. 
 
The solution is interesting but in-order to maintain the performance, the firewall 
needs more information, but not about the firewall rules, it needs information about 
the traffic. The traffic always gives you more information about why and how the 
firewall is not performing well. The type of characteristics that can help the BDD to 
perform well, are the high rejection nodes. Rejection nodes are the nodes in the 
firewall, that keeps track of all the nodes in the BDD tree that has the highest number 
of rejection. This rejection could be either due incoming packet not matching any 
specific field in the firewall or incoming packet not matching any rules at all in the 
firewall. 
 
In a linear-based BDD, the rejection nodes won’t be of much use, as the BDD is 
generated only once, the regeneration only happens when a new rule is either added 
or deleted from the firewall. To overcome this problem, two new approach is 
proposed and explained in detail in the following section. The approach is basically 
based on using the traffic characteristics of the firewall and then generating a new 
BDD from time-to-time. 
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Chapter 4: Static Shuffling Binary Decision Diagram (SSBDD) 
 
 
In this chapter a new method is proposed and it is called Static Shuffling Binary 
Decision Diagram or SSBDD. SSBDD is an improvement over a regular Binary 
Decision Diagram Packet Filter. The proposed method improves the performance of 
the firewall specially when the traffic it is receiving has a high rate of rejection 
packets. SSBDD uses the BDD as its base.  
 
It also adds two more properties on top of regular BDD to improve the performance; 
the Field Ordering and the Split size as shown in Figure 5, both of them will be 
discussed extensively in the coming chapters. Together with these two properties an 
efficient and optimized BDD is generated. The name Static Shuffling comes from the 
idea of the way it generates and parse the packet headers; instead of following the 
traditional way of reading the entire field, it reads n bits from each field. One of the 
advantage of this method, it is not affected by the dependency of rules in the firewall 
because it relies on traffic log instead of rule analysis 
 
There have been various studies conducted on the improvement of the firewall’s 
packet filter. Most of the research focused on the rule analysis of the firewall or 
rejection traffic of the firewall. In our case, SSBDD is focused on rejection traffic 
because in any BDD, the acceptance traffic will always traverse the entire BDD, 
which is not the case in rejection traffic.  
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Figure 5: SSBDD Architecture 
 
4.1 Split Size 
 
Split size in the context of BDD defines how many bits the BDD should traverse in 
each field before moving on to the next field. In the previous chapter, the importance 
of the traffic characteristics was discussed. For e.g. the Protocol Distribution section 
showed that checking 4 bits of protocol field will give the result more quickly than 
checking the 8 bits of the field. Split size property is defined at the beginning of the 
BDD generation. It is not only used at the parsing phase but it also used during the 
policy representation phase of the BDD. The use of the split size in the two different 
context of BDD is explained in the coming sections. The only downside of the split 
size, is it cannot be an odd number and the value cannot be more than 8, this is not 
due to a performance issue but it is merely due to programming limitations. 
 
The idea of split size is not the first time it is used in firewall packet filtering; the 
same technique is described (Boutaba, 2009). There’s no need for the BDD packet 
filter to go through an entire field before moving on the next field. Separating them 
into a non-contiguous block can be useful too. For example, the protocol numbers 
might be best represented if it’s bits be mapped from P0-P4 then P5-P8. So instead of 
Binary Decision 
Diagram 
Split size Field ordering 
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checking the entire 8 bits’ fields from P0-P8, it is a good idea to check the first 4 bits 
and then the rest of the bits later. 
 
4.1.1 Policy Representation Phase 
 
Choosing the right split size for the BDD generation is as same as choosing a right 
variable ordering for a BDD, which is an NP-complete problem. But based on the 
analysis, it is possible to decide the split size to be used for the BDD. For e.g. based 
on the Protocol Distribution section, it is shown that high number of traffic were 
related to the TCP protocol. The split size can then be changed easily by analyzing 
the traffic characteristics but it can only be changed once during the BDD generation 
phase.  
 
For example, assume having a simple packet header that consist of only source and 
destination fields each is just 4-bits long with all the rule’s decision is Allow. Table 4 
shows the demo packet header converted into Binary equivalent. Assuming the split 
size is set to 2. The Fig 6 shows how the Rule 1 will be represented. 
 
Rule # Source Destination 
R1 1011  1100  
R2 1001  1110  
R3 1010  1101  
 
Table 4: A Sample Policy List 
 
The left figure in Figure 6 shows the BDD representation of the firewall when the 
split size is considered and the figure on the right in Figure 6 shows the BDD 
representation of the firewall when the split size is not considered.  
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Figure 6: BDD Representation 
 
 
4.1.2 Packet Filtering Phase 
 
In the BDD packet filtering phase the split size defines the number of bits that must 
be checked by the packet filter before moving on to the next field in the firewall. So 
instead of considering the entire field of the firewall as one contiguous block, it is 
better to consider them as a non-contiguous block. For e.g. if a split size of 8 is 
chosen then the bits of the fields will be represented as shown in Table 5. 
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Field 
Field bits 
BDD variable 
Proto 
(0,7) 
0,7 
Source IP 
(0,7) 
8,15 
Destination IP 
(0,7) 
16, 23 
Source 
Port 
(0,7) 
24, 31 
Destination 
Port 
(0,7) 
32,39 
Source IP 
(8,16) 
40, 47 
Destination IP 
(8,16) 
48, 55 
Source 
Port 
(8,16) 
56,63 
Destination 
Port 
(8,16) 
64, 71 
Source IP 
(16,24) 
72, 79 
Destination IP 
(16, 24) 
80, 87 
Source IP 
(24, 32) 
88, 95 
Destination IP 
(24, 32) 
96, 103 
   
 
Table 5: Variable Ordering 
 
4.2 Field Ordering 
 
Majority of the packet filtering devices like firewalls do not give specific 
consideration for optimizing packet rejection. If a packet does not match any of the 
rules in the policy, then it is discarded because the default rule (last rule) is assumed 
to be deny (Hamed, Discovery of policy anomalies in distributed firewalls, 2004).  It 
is highly crucial for any firewall to implement a successful packet filtering. 
However, most of the packet filtering research done by authors focuses on exploiting 
the characteristics of filtering rules and ignores to consider the traffic behavior as 
another factor for optimization (Al-Shaer, 2006) schemes. 
 
Optimization of the firewall packet filtering can be done at various stages during 
packet filtering process. Since, our work focuses only on BDD, so only the 
optimization technique related to BDD is discussed in this research. One of the most 
important optimization technique is field order, field order plays a very important 
role in the firewall. During network attacks such as DOS, the traffic is created in 
 23 
such a way, that packets will always get rejected by the bottom rules or the last field 
of the bottom rules. If the fields are ordered in an optimal way, then the chance of 
packets being rejected at early stage increases which will then improve the 
performance of the firewall. But in a traditional firewall packet filter, the field order 
is fixed, which causes the performance to degrade during such network attacks.  
 
As the networking speed increases, it is very important for the firewall to improve its 
packet filtering performance. Time is an important factor when considering the 
performance of the packet filter. To improve the performance, it is much more 
important to focus on the rejection packets of the firewall because if the rejection 
packets are rejected by the deny-all rule then it can cause more harm to the 
performance. Thus, it is more important to focus on early packet rejection. 
 
There is an extensive amount of research work done on packet classification. The 
basic approach is to search the rules sequentially till a match is found. This approach 
is not time efficient because as the rule list increases the search time increases as 
well. So the performance of the basic approach is proportional to the length of the 
rule list in the firewall. Research on improving the search time for packet filtering 
uses one or more of the following approach: hardware-based solutions, specialized 
data structures, geometric algorithms, and heuristics (Al-Shaer, 2006). 
 
Our study of the network traffic collected from (CADA, n.d.) shows that the major 
portion of the traffic flows gets rejected at a field in the firewall rules. It is also 
observed that this distribution is likely to stay for a time interval, if this distribution 
property is considered then it is highly likely that it can improve the performance of 
the packet filter. Therefore, a new method is proposed in this research, that uses the 
field distribution as one of the factor to improve the performance of the packet filter. 
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The proposed method called, Static Shuffling BDD [SSBDD] uses a typical Binary 
Decision Diagram as its base. The tree is mainly focused to reject the traffic as early 
as possible because a rejected packet might traverse long decision path of rule 
matching before getting rejected by the default-to-deny rule in the firewall. As the 
number of rejection packets increases the performance degrades as it causes 
significant overhead on the firewall. The implementation of SSBDD does not require 
any sort of special support from the firewall. 
 
The SSBDD relies on field ordering for its optimization. Early rejection is possible in 
firewall if the field order is chosen efficiently. But choosing an optimal field order is 
an NP complete problem as the traffic is always random in nature. Predicting the 
type of traffic is not possible but a few assumptions can be made for any traffic based 
on the traffic characteristics. 
4.2.1 Field Count Distribution 
 
Another study conducted on the traffics to see the distribution of field counts. This 
study provides much more detailed overview into at which bit or node level of the 
field the packet got rejected. This data at first seems not useful but when collected 
from time to time can provide an overview into which fields is more important and 
can help to prioritize one field over other. It can also provide information to BDD, 
whether the BDD should start reading the packet headers from MSB to LSB or the 
other way around. 
 
For e.g. given any network traffic that is received from the router to the firewall, it is 
safe to assume that all the traffic reaching the firewall will belong to the network. 
Since, the organization has LAN network, so they’ll be having Private Address 
space. In that case, it is always best to start the search from MSB to LSB instead of 
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LSB to MSB. So it is suggested that depending on the traffic specifications the less 
important fields should be checked later in order to speed up the performance of the 
packet filter. 
4.2.2 Rule Reordering vs Field Reordering 
 
Rule reordering is the most focused area in the field of packet filtering. There has 
been various research work done on it. Based on the analysis shown above in Rule 
hit distribution, it is visible that reordering of the rule can have an impact on the 
packet filtering performance. But the success of rule reordering is mainly dependent 
on the how interconnected the rules are in the firewall rule list. If the majority of the 
rules are dependent, then rule reordering will not improve the firewall performance. 
 
On the other hand, field reordering seems like a good alternate solution. The main 
advantage of field reordering, it is not affected by the rule dependency. Because the 
field ordering happens at the search time. If given enough information about the 
traffic log, then an optimal field reordering can be achieved which can improve the 
performance of the firewall overall. 
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Chapter 5: Implementation 
 
In this chapter we will discuss about the implementation part of our proposed 
method. The implementation is applied once during the packet generation phase and 
then during the packet filtering phase, both of them are explained in detail. At last we 
check out the lookup comparison between the two of them. 
5.1 Policy Representation using SSBDD 
 
To generate an SSBDD for a given set of firewall rules, it has to go through 4 stages 
which starts from the taking the rule set as an input and onto the final stage that 
converts the rules into the final SSBDD. The chart below gives you the overview of 
what happens at each and every stage of the SSBDD generation. 
 
 
The final SSBDD which is generated is in a graphical format i.e. DOT format, the 
DOT format is only the user but the generation of the DOT format file is disabled as 
it increases the CPU processing time. The another format which is generated is a 
tuple set for each node in the BDD, this format is used for the parsing. 
5.1.1 Input the Firewall Rules 
 
The input file used by the program which contains the rule set or the traffic is in CSV 
format. The packets were collected from CAIDA. The metadata contains more 
information than it is needed so only the necessary information is collected from the 
Input the 
Firewall 
Rules 
Rules to 
Binary 
format 
Binary to 
Formula 
format 
SSBDD 
generation 
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file; source ip, source port, destination ip, destination port, and protocol. The format 
of the file for both the traffic and the firewall rule set is given below. 
<ip.proto,ip.len,ip.src,ip.dst,tcp.srcport,tcp.dstport,tcp.flags,udp.srcport,udp.dstport,
icmp.type,icmp.code> 
 
 
 
The above is the algorithm for reading the rules from the CSV file is given below. 
The file is opened in a reading mode and the code goes through the file line-by-line 
as each line contains one firewall rule in it. For every firewall rule that is read from 
the file is converted into first binary equivalent and then it is converted into the 
formula format. Once the above code is executed, the code will have the entire rule 
set converted into the formula format which is then written to the CSV file. 
  
with open(ruleFile, "rb") as csvfile: 
         
        pkt_reader = csv.reader(csvfile) 
        del dyn_order_var[:]    # Resetting the dyn_order_var now ... 
        read_config_file() 
 
        for pkts in pkt_reader: 
 
            newPkt = {} 
            for order in ruleConf.order: 
                if order == 'p': 
                    newPkt['p'] = pkts[field_pos['p']] 
                elif order == 's_ip': 
                    newPkt['s_ip'] = pkts[field_pos['s_ip']] 
                elif order == 's_p': 
                    newPkt['s_p'] = pkts[field_pos['s_p']] 
                elif order == 'd_ip': 
                    newPkt['d_ip'] = pkts[field_pos['d_ip']] 
                elif order == 'd_p': 
                    newPkt['d_p'] = pkts[field_pos['d_p']] 
 
             
            ruleListBin.append(dyn_ruleFormula(ruleToBin(newPkt))) 
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5.1.2 Rule to Binary Format 
 
In order for the BDD to be generated the values must be in binary format, so it is 
necessary to convert each and every rule or packet header into the equivalent binary 
format. The discussion on Binary conversion is also discussed in more detail in the 
Chapter BDD. This step is basically a conversion of the decimal values to the binary 
format. The algorithm for the binary conversion is shown below. 
  
def ruleToBin(pktRule): 
    """ 
        Takes the entire rule and then 
        convert the rule into a binary 
        format given below 
        [src-ip] = 00011100 
    """ 
 
    ruleBin = {} 
    for key, value in pktRule.iteritems(): 
 
        if int(key == "s_ip") | int(key == "d_ip"): 
            tmp = value.split('.')             
            ruleBin[key] = ""             
            for x in tmp: 
                ruleBin[key] += padding(((bin(int(x))).replace('b','')), 8) 
 
        elif int(key == "s_p") | int(key == "d_p"): 
            if len(value) > 0: 
                ruleBin[key] = (padding(((bin(int(value))).replace('b','')),16)) 
            else: 
                print "\tEither the Source or Destination Port is not given, skipping 
this rule ..." 
                return False 
 
        elif key == "p": 
            if (value.isdigit()): 
                ruleBin[key] = padding(((bin(int(value))).replace('b','')[::-1]),8) 
            else: 
                ruleBin[key] = padding(((bin(protocol[value])).replace('b','')[::-1]),8) 
 
    return ruleBin 
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A. Binary to Formula Format 
 
This is an important stage in the SSBDD generation process, once the rules are 
converted into its binary equivalent the next stage is to convert the rule into a 
formula format. The formula format shows what does each and every node in the 
BDD contains.  Below is the algorithm that shows how the binary equivalent rules 
are converted into the formula format. 
 
 
def dyn_ruleFormula(ruleBin): 
     
    # Convert the Binary rule format into a formula 
     
    s_ip_len = 33 
    d_ip_len = 33 
    s_p_len = 17 
    d_p_len = 17 
    p_len = 9 
 
    s_ip_tracker = 1 
    d_ip_tracker = 1 
    s_p_tracker = 1 
    d_p_tracker = 1 
    p_tracker = 1 
 
    tmp_s_ip = {} 
    tmp_d_ip = {} 
    tmp_s_p = {} 
    tmp_d_p = {} 
    tmp_p = {} 
 
    for j in ruleBin['s_ip']: 
        if s_ip_len != s_ip_tracker: 
            tmp_s_ip['s_ip'+str(s_ip_tracker)] = j 
            s_ip_tracker += 1 
 
    for k in ruleBin['d_ip']: 
        if d_ip_len != d_ip_tracker: 
            tmp_d_ip['d_ip'+str(d_ip_tracker)] = k 
            d_ip_tracker += 1 
…… 
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5.1.3 SSBDD Generation  
 
The final phase of the SSBDD generation is simple writing the formula generated 
above into a formula file. This formula file is then used to generate the graphical 
BDD, which is disabled in this stage as it increases the CPU processing time. Below 
is an example f what exactly does the formula file contains.  
 
 
    for m in ruleBin['d_p']: 
        if d_p_len != d_p_tracker: 
            tmp_d_p['d_p'+str(d_p_tracker)] = m 
            d_p_tracker += 1 
 
    for n in ruleBin['p']: 
        if p_len != p_tracker: 
            tmp_p['p'+str(p_tracker)] = n 
            p_tracker += 1 
 
    s_ip_tracker = 1 
    d_ip_tracker = 1 
    s_p_tracker = 1 
    d_p_tracker = 1 
    p_tracker = 1 
 
    ruleFormula = collections.OrderedDict() 
 
    for tmp in dyn_order_var: 
     tmp_field = tmp['og'] 
     if tmp['field_name'] == 's_ip': 
      ruleFormula[tmp_field] = tmp_s_ip[tmp_field] 
     elif tmp['field_name'] == 'd_ip': 
      ruleFormula[tmp_field] = tmp_d_ip[tmp_field] 
     elif tmp['field_name'] == 's_p': 
      ruleFormula[tmp_field] = tmp_s_p[tmp_field] 
     elif tmp['field_name'] == 'd_p': 
      ruleFormula[tmp_field] = tmp_d_p[tmp_field] 
     elif tmp['field_name'] == 'p': 
      ruleFormula[tmp_field] = tmp_p[tmp_field] 
 
    return ruleFormula 
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Let p = Protocol = TCP 
 = (p1 & p2 & p3 & p4 & p5 & ~p6 & ~p7 & p8) 
 
The above example shows how the binary equivalent of the TCP protocol will be 
written in the formula file in the end. 
5.2 SSBDD Packet Filtering 
 
Packet filtering is the next stage of SSBDD, at this stage the packet is received by the 
packet filter which is then used to traverse the SSBDD to determine whether or not 
to accept or reject the packet. The step-by-step flow diagram is given below; it is 
same as the one described in the SSBDD generation phase. The only difference is in 
the last stage, instead of generating the BDD it will traverse the BDD. The final stage 
is merely a comparison stage where each node value is compared to see if it matches 
or not. The earlier stages of the SSBDD Packet Filter has been explained before. 
 
 
 
Below is the implementation of SSBDD traversal that traverses the SSBDD tree once 
it receives a packet. 
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def pktMatcher(pktBin, ruleBDD): 
 
    global nextNode 
    global matchHit 
    global tmpRuleBDD 
    tmpRuleBDD = ruleBDD 
 
    tmp_h_table = {} 
 
    for data in ruleBDD['h_table'].items(): 
        tmp_h_table[data[1]] = data[0] 
 
    for pktData in pktBin.items(): 
        if str(nextNode) == "1": 
            log_data = "\tPacket has been accepted now ... and the hit count is 
"+str(matchHit) + "\n" 
            writeLog(log_data) 
            matchHit = 0 
            return 
 
     elif str(nextNode) != "-1": 
            if (db._get_var_name(ruleBDD, nextNode)) == pktData[0]: 
 
                if str(pktData[1]) == "0": 
                    indice = int(pktData[1])+1 
                elif str(pktData[1]) == "1": 
                    indice = 2 
 
                if not is_matching(tmp_h_table[nextNode][indice]): 
                    return 
            else: 
                nextNode = nextNode - 1 
                while True: 
                    if (db._get_var_name(ruleBDD, nextNode)) == pktData[0]: 
                        break; 
                    else: 
                        nextNode = nextNode - 1 
 
                if str(pktData[1]) == "0": 
                    indice = int(pktData[1])+1 
                elif str(pktData[1]) == "1": 
                    indice = 2 
 
                if not is_matching(tmp_h_table[nextNode][indice]): 
                    return 
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5.3 BDD Packet Filter vs SSBDD Packet Filter 
 
The explanation of SSBDD generation and traversal is done in the previous section 
in detail. To see the practical approach of SSBDD, a single rule is provided to both 
the BDD’s – BDD packet filter and SSBDD packet filter. This provides a clear 
overview of how the packet filter works at the filtering level. Since the BDD requires 
the rule to be converted into binary format so the binary equivalent of the rule is 
written instead of it’s decimal format. The Table 6 contains the Binary equivalent of 
the rule.  
 
if not is_matching(tmp_h_table[nextNode][indice]): 
                    return 
 
        elif str(nextNode) == "-1": 
            nextNode = len(tmp_h_table)+1 
            if (db._get_var_name(ruleBDD, nextNode)) == pktData[0]: 
 
                if str(pktData[1]) == "0": 
                    indice = int(pktData[1])+1 
                elif str(pktData[1]) == "1": 
                    indice = 2 
 
                if not is_matching(tmp_h_table[nextNode][indice]): 
                    return 
            else: 
                nextNode = nextNode - 1 
                while True: 
                    if (db._get_var_name(ruleBDD, nextNode)) == pktData[0]: 
                        break; 
                    else: 
                        nextNode = nextNode - 1 
                if str(pktData[1]) == "0": 
                    indice = int(pktData[1])+1 
                elif str(pktData[1]) == "1": 
                    indice = 2 
                if not is_matching(tmp_h_table[nextNode][indice]): 
                    return 
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Protocol 0000 0110 
Source IP 11000000 10101000 00100001 11110111 
Destination IP 11000000 10101000 00100000 01111101 
Source Port 00000100 00011010 
Destination Port 00001101 00111101 
 
Table 6: Binary equivalent of a rule 
 
5.3.1 BDD Packet Filter 
 
In a regular BDD packet filter, the traversal is done by going from one field to the 
another field like a regular firewall. Below is a single packet converted into its binary 
equivalent. Once converted it starts from the first field and takes the entire field and 
starts the traversal. In a regular BDD packet filter, the field order is fixed so they 
cannot be changed. This is the limitation of this BDD because several traffic can be 
rejected earlier or may be some bits are not needed to be checked in order to get the 
decision. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: BDD Packet Filter 
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5.3.2 SSBDD Packet Filter 
 
In SSBDD filter since the field order can be changed based on the traffic analysis 
which shows what fields are more important than the other. Another important factor 
which was discussed in detail in Chapter Split Size, deciding how many bits to check 
from each field before moving on to the another field. 
Since at the beginning there’s no traffic log to analyze so SSBDD will go with a 
default option of setting the property to the following values 
<field order = protocol, source ip, destination ip, source port, destination port> 
<split size = 8> 
 
 
 
Figure 8: SSBDD Packet Filter 
 
In Figure 8 it is visible that instead of checking the entire field at a time, SSBDD 
takes 8 bits from each field and then goes to another field. The advantage here over 
the BDD packet filter is the necessary bits are not checked at the first stage instead 
they are delayed for the next stage. This gives a performance improvement to 
SSBDD which can be very useful when there’s a high amount of rejection traffic. 
An interesting question about the BDD approach is with regard to how robust the 
BDDs are to the access list rule structure. Techniques such as RFC, cross-production 
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and the tuple space search rely heavily on structured access lists for good 
performance – some even become unusable in extreme conditions. This question is 
tackled in Chapter 6 once the experimental evidence has been presented.  
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Chapter 6: Analytical Discussion of the SSBDD 
 
The previous chapter provides a framework for the construction of SSBDD, 
representations of access lists and using them to perform lookup in packet filters. 
This chapter presents an analytical discussion into SSBDD approach to packet 
filtering. The main reason behind this chapter is to discuss the computing aspects of 
the SSBDD packet filter and get an overview of the lookup time.  
The discussion begins into what SSBDD representations of access lists look like and 
what determines the structure of these SSBDDs, since the shape and size of a 
SSBDD directly affects its time and space performance. Then the discussion goes 
into the bounds for, as well as factors affecting, the lookup time of the BDD packet 
filter, while the next section discusses factors affecting memory usage.  
 
6.1 SSBDD Representation of Access List 
 
The SSBDD representation of an access list is a regular BDD and it describes at a 
lowest level of what packets are accepted or rejected by the packet filter. SSBDD 
contains two nodes 1 or 0 which are the terminal nodes, where 1 means the packet is 
Accepted and 0 means the packet is Rejected. Every node in the SSBDD refers to a 
particular bit in the packet header. Reaching to the terminal node 0 – rejection node – 
has more than one path and the same applies to the acceptance traffic as well, so 
these complete set of paths for rejection and acceptance is the entire search space of 
the SSBDD. 
To understand the concept of the access list in SSBDD let’s consider a demo access 
list shown below in Table 7. This list accepts only TCP and UDP type traffic and 
from the certain IP address as mentioned in the access list itself. Although this is a 
somewhat an unlikely access list in a real world scenario, it does share some 
properties with real access lists which is important to understand the sections to be 
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discussed ahead. This access list is going to be used in the rest of this chapter to 
explain the sections ahead. 
 
Rule 
# 
Source Addr Destination Addr Source 
Port 
Destination 
Port 
Protocol 
1 192.168.1.10 10.23.12.43.2 9000 80 TCP 
2 172.16.2.12 80.75.45.3.12 10234 80 TCP 
3 192.168.3.10 98.3.12.5 8769 878 UDP 
 
Table 7: Sample Access List 
 
There are many factors that can affect the structure of the SSBDD, not all the factors 
can be controlled but there are few factors which can be controlled. Those factors 
were discussed in detailed in the Chapter Packet filter optimization and Chapter Split 
size. Field ordering is one factor that can improve the performance of the firewall’s 
packet filtering. If the field order is chosen correctly, then it can improve the 
performance of the packet filter. In a regular BDD based packet filter the field order 
is fixed and cannot be changed so the factor of field ordering is not considered. The 
shape and size of a BDD representing an access list are affected by various factors 
such as the number of nodes, number of variables and BDD depth, which in turn 
affects the performance of the SSBDD packet filter. 
Of the factors affecting the structure of the BDD, some can be controlled and others 
cannot. The two main factors involved are the access list itself and the variable 
ordering of the BDD. The variable ordering of the BDD can be manipulated to 
improve the performance of the packet filter, whereas the access list is generally 
fixed. Variable orderings can also often be chosen to take advantage of the rule 
structure in the access list. The next two sections discuss how these factors affect the 
structure of the BDD.  
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6.1.1 The Effect of Rule Structure 
 
SSBDD consist of number of variables and these variables are reference to the 
packet header bits of the access list. This illustrates two points. Firstly, during the 
SSBDD construction the variables that are not needed are automatically excluded in 
the construction process. This optimization is very useful as it can affect the 
performance of the SSBDD overall. Second point, the number of variable in SSBDD 
is completely dependent on the complexity of the access list. The more specific the 
rule is the more variables an SSBDD will need. 
Common values in the field is also another factor that can affect the SSBDD of the 
access list. Rule that share common values with another rule can often help the 
SSBDD to generate less variable. For example, Rule # 1 and Rule # 2 shares the 
same destination port i.e. 80, so during the SSBDD generation time both the rule will 
share the variables but will have different exit points. This aggregation of similar 
values greatly affects the size of the BDD, since the degree to which expression in 
the BDD can be shared determines the number of nodes required for the BDD. In a 
simple statement, the more data the rules share the less variables the SSBDD will 
need. 
 
6.1.2 The Effect of Variable Ordering 
 
The variable ordering chosen for the example has the source address first followed 
by the source port then destination address then destination port and then protocol at 
the end. During the lookup the source address will always be checked first but what 
if the packet that is coming is not a TCP or a UDP protocol. Even though if the 
addresses the packet will still have to go through the first field and then get rejected 
at the end. If a different variable ordering is used – for example having the protocol 
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field appearing as the first testing for every packet, then the packet filter may be able 
to reject packets early. Since the protocol has the smallest field size so less number 
of bits will be checked. 
Changing the field ordering does not change the semantics of the SSBDD for any 
given access list as they are semantically equivalent. The only change in the SSBDD 
will be its structure. The number of nodes, the path lengths, and the order in which 
the variables appear from root node will be different. 
Different field ordering will have a different affect on the overall SSBDD structure. 
It is very common to see that on ordering can reduce the path lengths or vice versa. 
The memory usage of SSBDD is completely dependent on how long is the SSBDD. 
The bigger the SSBDD the more memory it will take which will in turn take more 
time to traverse the SSBDD. So it is safe to make this assumption that different 
variable ordering creates different space-time tradeoffs.  
6.2 Performing Lookup on a SSBDD 
 
The SSBDD algorithm starts from the first node – root node, checks the value and 
follows the appropriate edge of the node. This process will continue until the the 
terminal nodes is reached. If the the terminal node is 0 then the packet is rejected or 
accepted if the terminal node is 1. So, the time taken by the SSBDD to reach a 
specific decision is equivalent to the length of the path traversal the SSBDD follows. 
6.2.1 Worst Case Analysis 
The worst case in SSBDD occurs only when the SSBDD traverses the longest path to 
reach the terminal node. In other words, it can be assumed that, the worst case occurs 
when the SSBDD traverses most of the nodes in the SSBDD.  
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 The upper bound of the SSBDD structure defines how many nodes the 
SSBDD will traverse in its worst case scenario. Since the variable needed to 
create the SSBDD is based on the rule structure so the worst case scenario of 
the SSBDD will never exceed the maximum number of nodes used in the 
SSBDD. 
 In the worst case scenario, the SSBDD is meant to traverse majority of the 
nodes. But to represent any given rule in SSBDD it needs n variable. So the 
SSBDD will never exceed more than n variable to reach a decision. The 
lower bound of the SSBDD will always be either exactly the n variable 
needed to represent the SSBDD or less than the n variable. 
6.2.2 Best Case Analysis 
The best case of the lookup algorithm depends on the variable ordering of the 
SSBDD, so different SSBDD will lead into a different result. Best case in SSBDD 
occurs only when the SSBDD choses the shortest path from the tree to reach a 
terminal node. In majority of the SSBDD the best case can occur during the 
matching of the protocol field since it requires maximum of 8 nodes.  
It also worth noticing that the best case of SSBDD can also be reduced from 8 nodes 
to 4 nodes comparison. For example, if taking the protocol field, it requires 8 bits to 
represent in the SSBDD but the maximum number of protocol used in Internet traffic 
is either TCP, UDP, or ICMP, which can be represented easily on SSBDD from the 
first 4 bits. So the best case of the SSBDD can also be 4 nodes if the SSBDD 
considers checking the first 4 bits first instead of checking all the 8 bits. 
The best case scenario has little value because in real world it is unlikely to occur in 
practice. If the firewall is receiving more accepted traffic, then the rejection traffic so 
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the best case scenario will not occur as the best case scenario usually means the 
packet is getting rejected.  
 
6.3 Memory Usage of SSBDD  
 
The memory usage of SSBDD is based on the number of nodes that are needed to 
represent the access list. As shown in the Section 1 (a) and 1 (b) discusses the factors 
that can affect the overall structure of the SSBDD. The same factors are discussed in 
detail as a separate chapter – Split Size and Field Ordering.  
In real world, the access list usually has lots of similarity between rules, this is due to 
the fact that the firewall is filtering between multiple networks internally. So with 
this assumption, it can be said, that the possibility of rules sharing nodes in SSBDD 
is very high which in the end can reduce the overall count of the nodes in the 
SSBDD. For example, if the source address in the Rule #1 and Rule #3 shares the 
same first two bytes which means the nodes will be shared for the first byte in the 
SSBDD. These little factors can greatly contribute to the structure of the access list 
in the SSBDD.  
Predicting the number of nodes that the SSBDD will take is not possible as it is 
shown earlier that it can vary based on the field ordering. But having the knowledge 
of the access list can help to understand the right field order for the SSBDD in order 
to create a better and compact structure.  
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Chapter 7: Architecture and Simulation 
 
Experimental evaluation is the predominant technique used in this research for 
evaluating the SSBDD packet filter and fulfilling the research objectives.  Evaluation 
is achieved by comparing the SSBDD packet filter to a packet filter that evaluates its 
rules sequentially. Two sequential packet filters are used for comparison and details 
regarding these are given later.  
In order to achieve meaningful and generalizable results, it is important for the 
experimental methodology to provide an experimental environment that is as realistic 
as possible. This chapter is devoted to discussing how this is achieved, starting with 
the overall experimental setup and then investigating its components separately.  
First the implementation part of the system is discussed in detail with all of it’s 
module involved in it. This is followed by an explanation of the simulation 
environment, which discusses the technical specs of the system used to evaluate the 
performance of both the BDDs. The next section discusses the Simulation Data that 
is used by the system to evaluate the performance of the BDDs. At end the Timing 
section will discuss how the performance is evaluated for the BDDs.  
7.1 System Implementation 
 
This section discusses the specifications of the packet filters in this research, as well 
as some important factors affecting their design and implementation. It then presents 
the implementations of the SSBDD and list-based or field-based packet filters.  
7.1.1 Packet Filter Specification 
 
The key requirement of the proposed packet filters used in this research is that they 
be stateless, meaning that the decision of whether to accept or reject a packet is 
based on each packet individually, independently from what happened in the past. 
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This forces each filter to invoke its lookup algorithm for every packet. The proposed 
packet filters are not required to handle fragmented packets since fragmentation can 
be resolved with caching, which is not the part of the research focus. 
 
Furthermore, each packet filter must allow filtering of IP packets on the following 
fields:  
 
o Source and destination address(es): Single IP addresses are accepted the current 
research work does not support the use of masking in the IP address. 
o Source and destination port numbers: Single numbers only are accepted.  
 
o Protocol type: This refers to the transport protocol type. Accepted values are 
TCP, and UDP 
 
 
If any field is omitted from a rule, it is skipped from and the packet filter moves to 
the next packet. For example, if the protocol field is ICMP then the packet is not 
considered since there won’t be any source and destination port number given for it. 
Finally, each packet filter must support the two actions PERMIT and DENY.  
 
7.2 Coding and Modules 
 
The programming language used to implement the SSBDD packet filter is Python. 
The code to implement the regular Binary Decision Diagram is already implemented 
in [1]. The SSBDD’s coding work is basically an extension to the Tyler’s [1] work. 
The regular BDD implementation shown in [1] is based on the research work 
conducted in [2]. 
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Figure 9: Modules of SSBDD implementation 
 
Figure 9 shows the name of the 3 important modules for the SSBDD implementation. 
The above are not the only modules of the system, there are many more modules 
used behind the system but explaining that is not necessary. The main working of 
these implementation are as follows: 
 
7.2.1 RunMe.py  
 
This is the main module of SSBDD. The simulation starts by executing this file 
which then calls the rest of the other files. In order, to execute the module there are 
certain prerequisite that should be met.  
The following are the pre-requisite that is needed to execute the module RunMe.py 
 The config.py file must be present, this file defines the two parameters 
that were discussed in the earlier chapters – field ordering and split size.  
Formula.py 
MatchRule.py 
RunMe.py 
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 CSV file that contains all the rules needed for the given simulation. The 
rules must be in CSV format and the structure of the rules should follow 
the structure give below: 
<ip.proto,ip.len,ip.src,ip.dst,tcp.srcport,tcp.dstport,tcp.flags,udp.srcport,udp.dstp
ort,icmp.type,icmp.code> 
 CSV file that contains all the packets needed for the simulation. The 
packets must be in CSV format again and also the structure must follow 
the same structure as mentioned for the rule file. 
This module at the end will provide the following outcome. 
 Calling the other necessary modules to generate the BDD and SSBDD. 
 Performing the packet filter. 
 Displaying the CPU Performance Time for both the BDDs. 
 Displaying the count of Accepted, Rejected, and Total Traffic received by 
the packet filter. 
 
7.2.2 Formula.py 
 
In order to generate a BDD, the rules first must be converted into a Binary equivalent 
and then the binary formatted rule is then converted into a Boolean expression or a 
formula. All that conversion process is taken care by this module.  
This module is not called independently, instead it is called by the RunMe.py 
module, and it only asks for a file name that has the rules in it.  The following are the 
task that this module will perform in order to generate a single binary expression or a 
formula which is then written into a file. 
o Reading the CSV rule file line-by-line. 
o Converting the rule into a binary format. 
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o Converting the binary formatted rule into a formula or boolean expression. 
o Writing the generated formula into a file. 
 
Once this module is executed, the program will generate a single binary expression 
for the entire rule set given to it. And also, if the user asks, a graphical BDD and 
SSBDD. The option of generating the graphical BDD and SSBDD is usually 
disabled as it consumes lot of CPU Processing Time which is not necessary. 
 
7.2.3 MatchRule.py 
 
This is the final module and it is called when the BDD and SSBDD have been 
generated for the provided rule set. It is not executed independently; it is called by 
the RunMe.py module. The following are the pre-requisite of this module: - 
 
 Needs the reference to the generated BDD and SSBDD for the given rule set. 
 
 CSV file that contains all the packets needed for the simulation. The packets 
must be in CSV format again and also the structure must follow the same 
structure as mentioned for the rule file. 
 
The outcome of this module is to go through each packet one at a time and then 
perform a matching by traversing the BDD. At the end, the result of accepted and 
rejected traffic is given to the main module. 
7.3 Other coding modules 
 
The above were the only coding modules that were implemented from the scratch. 
There are other modules too that are called in the background in to generate the BDD 
and SSBDD. The packet filtering or traversing BDD and SSBDD module is a part of 
MatchRule.py which is explained in the previous section. 
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Figure 10: Other Coding Modules. 
 
The above are the rest of the two modules which are implemented by Tyler’s, the 
code is open-source and it can be downloaded from (Tyler). The two modules are 
dependent on each other and with these two modules none of the above modules 
would run. 
7.4 Simulation Environment 
 
In order to simulate real packet filtering scenarios, an Amazon Web Server was used 
to run the system. Running the system on a regular machine takes days to execute 
even with a lowest traffic volume. The simulation environment uses just one server 
and the same server traverses the rules file first and converts it into a BDD and 
SSBDD. Then the packet file is read and it is passed against the rule.  
 
To evaluate the performance of the system, CPU Processing Time is considered and 
it is started right when the rule is read by the system and stops when all the packets 
have been parsed by it. The specification of the server on the AWS are as follows: - 
 
PBL 
[Python 
Boolean 
algebra 
Library]  
PLY  
[Python 
binding to Lex 
and Yacc] 
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Processor Type Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3 (Haswell processor) 
Processor Speed 2.9 GHz 
CPU Count 2  
RAM 3.75 GiB 
Hard Disk Drive 40 GB SSD 
 
Table 8: Specification 
 
7.5 Simulation Dataset 
 
In this section we describe the data used in the experimental study.  The data set used 
in the experimental study is obtained from a CAIDA. The data provided by them 
consist of around 17 million packet header information.  
 
The demo of the packet header is shown below. Not all the data mentioned in the 
dataset is used. For e.g. for the simulation purpose of our system only source ip, 
destination ip, source port, destination port, and protocol field is used rest all the 
other fields are skipped. 
<ip.proto,ip.len,ip.src,ip.dst,tcp.srcport,tcp.dstport,tcp.flags,udp.srcport,udp.dstport,
icmp.type,icmp.code> 
 
7.6 Simulation Framework 
 
The framework used for the simulation purpose act like any regular firewall and 
requires a set of rules and packets to process. The dataset that is been used for the 
evaluation purpose does not contain any firewall rules. So randomly packets were 
chosen from dataset and were used as a firewall rule. By default, all the firewall 
rule’s action property was set to Allow. Since the packets whose rule exist in the 
firewall and whose Actions is either Allow or Deny will traverse the entire BDD. But 
the main focus of this research work is for early packet rejections.  
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The simulation performed on the system were different each time with a different set 
of firewall rules, different amount of traffic, and mostly different set of acceptance vs 
rejection ratio. Since, the research work is mostly focused on early rejection, so the 
amount of traffic that were passed against the firewall rules had a high rejection 
ratio.  
                         
 
Figure 11: Simulation Framework Overview 
 
Figure 11 gives an overview of what does the simulation framework contains. For 
every simulation the three parameters as shown in the Figure 3 were changed. The 
simulation was performed on both the BDD’s regular BDD and SSBDD. 
  
Packet Filter 
Rejection 
Ratio 
Firewall 
Rule 
Traffic 
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Chapter 8: Statistics  
 
This chapter covers the result of the experimental evaluation of the SSBDD packet 
filter. In the experimental evaluation, the efficacy of the SSBDD approach to packet 
filtering is evaluated in terms of lookup. For the experiments performed, two sets of 
data were collected – Linear BDD and Static Shuffling BDD. The CPU Timing 
functionality was implemented by inserting the code to keep track of the overall 
execution time.  
In each and every experiment different set of Acceptance and Rejection Ratio were 
used, to see the performance of the SSBDD during different rejection ratio. This 
provides a better randomness in terms of simulation and at the same time will 
provide a better result to verify the performance of BDD vs SSBDD. Each 
experiment has 4 sets of simulation in them, where each simulation is run twice – 
once on BDD and another one on SSBDD. The statistics that are shown in the graphs 
below are based on the CPU timing. 
 
8.1 Simulation Results  
 
This section shows the performance of the various simulations that was performed on 
the BDD based packet filter and SSBDD based packet filter. Each simulation has 
been performed 4 times for BDD and SSBDD based packet filter, where each 
simulation has varying sets of traffic passed to it with a varying set of firewall rules 
for it.  
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8.1.1 Experiment A 
 
Acceptance Ratio = 10% & Rejection Ratio = 90% 
 
 
Figure 12: Experiment A Result 
8.1.2 Experiment B 
 
Acceptance Ratio = 5% & Rejection Ratio = 95% 
 
 
Figure 13: Experiment B Result 
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8.1.3 Experiment C 
 
Acceptance Ratio = 95% & Rejection Ratio = 5% 
 
 
 
8.1.4 Experiment D  
 
Acceptance Ratio = 50% & Rejection Ratio = 50% 
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Figure 14: Experiment C Result 
 
Figure 15: Experiment D Result 
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8.1.5 Experiment E  
 
Acceptance Ratio = 70% & Rejection Ratio = 30% 
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Figure 16: Experiment E Result 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion and Future Work 
 
The contribution of this research was to find an efficient way to represent the access 
filters of the packet filtering firewall. Packet filtering is the mechanism that is being 
implemented in every hardware or software firewall. The issue with a traditional 
packet filtering firewall, they perform rule matching sequentially. So, the latency 
issued by this lookup process is equal to the size of the list. 
The representation technique used in this research work is based on BDD. This 
follows from the fact that BDDs is capable of providing a compact representation for 
complex Boolean functions. The aim of this research was for two fold, in the first 
fold, a new method was proposed to provide an efficient way to represent the access 
list. The second fold was to evaluate the performance of the BDD in terms of their 
lookup and also memory requirements.  
9.1 Future Work 
 
This section discusses the improvement areas of the SSBDD that can improve the 
performance of it. These ideas, as well as others, are discussed in this section in 
detail. Some ideas require more extensive research, while others are simple enough 
to be implemented easily. 
9.1.1 Variable Ordering and Reordering Prediction 
Variable ordering is the major factor for performance improvement. Currently in this 
research, SSBDD analyzes the access list to come up with a better variable ordering 
at first, since there’s no traffic to analyze. Later on after several million packets the 
SSBDD then uses the traffic characteristics to choose an optimal variable ordering. 
Choosing good variable orderings for lookup is most effective when traffic is taken 
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into consideration, so an algorithm that can continuously monitor the traffic and 
update the variable ordering instead of checking after every several million packets 
would maximize the potential of SSBDD packet filter. 
9.1.2 Updating the SSBDD 
Any change in the split size or variable ordering or in the access list requires the 
SSBDD to be regenerated again. SSBDD regeneration is a time consuming process, 
but if the SSBDD is able to update itself incrementally then it can save a lot of CPU 
processing time and improve the performance overall.   
9.1.3 Considering more Parameters for Performance 
As the scope of the thesis, CPU time was considered as a performance factor. But 
more factors can be considered, such as – memory utilization, CPU utilization etc. 
CPU utilization can give a better overview of the proposed method, in terms of how 
much load it is putting on the CPU. 
9.2 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this research was to propose a new method for the purpose of 
representing the access list of the firewall. This aim was achieved in two ways. 
Firstly, the proposed method SSBDD was discussed in detail. Secondly, the 
simulation was performed to prove that SSBDD performs efficiently. The advantages 
of this approach extend beyond performance as it helps to understand other problems 
with traditional packet filter.  
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